When less is more: The effect of reducing auditor liability on auditor judgments in principles-based and rules-based environments
作者： Linda A. Quick
DOI:
关键词:
摘要: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the joint effects accounting guidance type (principles-based versus rules-based) and legal liability regime (unlimited limited) on auditor decisions. Both Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) believe that moving more principles-based standards in United States will allow companies auditors appropriately reflect economic substance transactions financial statements. However, very little attention has been paid possibility be applied differently than other countries due a different regime. This explores how regimes impact judgments rules-based environments. Results suggest auditors' decisions differ based guidance, regulators may want consider when evaluating potential change standards. In my study, I predict find transaction suggests relatively aggressive treatment appropriate, make most consistent with under combination limited liability.
参考文章(37)
Karl Hackenbrack, Mark W. Nelson, Andrew D. Cuccia, The ability of professional standards to mitigate aggressive reporting Accounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association. ,vol. 70, pp. 227- 248 ,(1995)
R.R. King, N. Dopuch, NEGLIGENCE VERSUS STRICT LIABILITY REGIMES IN AUDITING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION Research Papers in Economics. ,(1990)
Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: Toward A Social Contingency Model Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. ,vol. 25, pp. 331- 376 ,(1992) , 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60287-7
Karen Siegel-Jacobs, J.Frank Yates, Effects of procedural and outcome accountability on judgment quality Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. ,vol. 65, pp. 1- 17 ,(1996) , 10.1006/OBHD.1996.0001
Todd DeZoort, Paul Harrison, Mark Taylor, Accountability and auditors’ materiality judgments: The effects of differential pressure strength on conservatism, variability, and effort Accounting, Organizations and Society. ,vol. 31, pp. 373- 390 ,(2006) , 10.1016/J.AOS.2005.09.001
M.B. Gietzmann, R. Quick, Capping auditor liability: The German experience Accounting, Organizations and Society. ,vol. 23, pp. 81- 103 ,(1998) , 10.1016/S0361-3682(96)00047-5
Ananth Seetharaman, Ferdinand A. Gul, Stephen G. Lynn, Litigation risk and audit fees: evidence from UK firms cross-listed on US markets Journal of Accounting and Economics. ,vol. 33, pp. 91- 115 ,(2002) , 10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00046-5
Nicholas Dopuch, Daniel E. Ingberman, Ronald R. King, An experimental investigation of multi-defendant bargaining in ‘joint and several’ and proportionate liability regimes Journal of Accounting and Economics. ,vol. 23, pp. 189- 221 ,(1997) , 10.1016/S0165-4101(97)00005-0
Jennifer S. Lerner, Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological Bulletin. ,vol. 125, pp. 255- 275 ,(1999) , 10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.255
Terence Bu-Peow Ng, Hun-Tong Tan, Effects of Authoritative Guidance Availability and Audit Committee Effectiveness on Auditors' Judgments in an Auditor‐Client Negotiation Context The Accounting Review. ,vol. 78, pp. 801- 818 ,(2003) , 10.2308/ACCR.2003.78.3.801