Sharing profit in parallel and serial transport networks

作者: Sofia Grahn-Voorneveld

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摘要: This paper studies the incentives for different countries to cooperate concerning pricing in transport systems, and how handle profit from such cooperation. Two types of simple networks with congestion are considered; one parallel links, serial network a number consecutive links. The owner each link tolls traffic using link. First cooperative behavior among studied, shown be considerable. is done by non-cooperative game theory. Second, theory used analyse solution concepts allocating resources raised

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