WHY STATES TOLL : AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF FINANCE CHOICE

作者: David M Levinson

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摘要: This paper examines the question of why some states impose tolls while others rely more heavily on fuel and other taxes. A model to predict share street highway revenue from is estimated as a function non-resident workers, policies neighbouring states, historical factors, population. The greater likelihood tolling, after controlling for miles toll road planned or constructed before 1956 Interstate Act. Similarly if state exports number residents work out-of-state those toll, it will be likely retaliate by imposing its own tolls. Decentralisation finance control network federal state, metropolitan, city county levels government increase incentives highway-managing jurisdiction

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