COMMON REASONING IN GAMES: A LEWISIAN ANALYSIS OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF RATIONALITY
作者： Robin P. Cubitt , Robert Sugden
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267114000339
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摘要: Abstract: We present a new class of models players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis’s account common knowledge. argue that the this formalise knowledge rationality way is distinctive, virtue modelling steps reasoning; and attractive, being able to represent coherently any consistent standard individual decision-theoretic rationality. contrast our approach with Robert Aumann (1987), arguing former avoids diagnoses certain paradoxes which latter may give rise when extended particular ways.
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