Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory

作者: Giacomo Bonanno

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摘要: This is a draft of chapter prepared for the planned Handbook Epistemic Logic, edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joe Halpern, Wiebe der Hoek and Barteld Kooi, College Publications. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Models Strategic-Form Games 3. Semantic Analysis Common Belief Rationality 4. Syntactic Characterization 5. versus Knowledge 6. Probabilistic Beliefs von Neumann-Morgenstern Payoffs 7. Dynamic with Perfect Information 8. The Semantics Revision 9. in Perfect-Information 10. Literature Review

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