Essays on the effects of bank mergers
作者： Charles B. Ruscher
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摘要: This dissertation examines effects of bank mergers on commercial and industrial (C&I) borrower firms' stockholders around various merger event dates. In addition, change in executive compensation surrounding is analyzed. Chapter one presents evidence that a strong lending relationship exists between firms their lenders altered by mergers. Negative abnormal stock returns experienced borrowing fi-om banks are investigated to ascertain the explanatory power hypothesis. found be attributable brought about we find delayed capital-market response firm events. We conclude incur significant economic costs changes banking relationships resulting two tests hypothesis managerialism, defined as top executives seeking maximize own wealth terms perquisites rather than maximization firm's value. chapter contrary managerialism It appears 1991 FDICIA law has effectively mitigated managerizilism ranks executives. However, also suggests upper-middle management merged have not been constrained FDICIA. These upper middle-level consistently receive higher non-merged peers.
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