Chapter 5 - Contractual Choice in Tunisian Fishing*

作者: Mongi Azabou , Lotfi Bouzaïane , Jeffrey B. Nugent

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-87487-0.50015-3

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摘要: Publisher Summary The fishing industry is an important one for investigating the determinants of contractual choice in Tunisia, not only because fact that contracts tend to be quite different than other sectors but also growing economic importance country. This chapter describes terrain Tunisian and determines extent which pervasiveness share industry, was mostly based on experience developed countries, applies Tunisia. As a result dearth sources fresh water country, virtually all Tunisia's coastal fishing. Nevertheless, remarkably heterogeneous. Despite heterogeneity, by large, are as dominant Tunisia they elsewhere. explains how disadvantages minimized specific circumstances.

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