The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
作者： Atila Abdulkadiroğlu , Nikhil Agarwal , Parag A. Pathak
DOI: 10.1257/AER.20151425
关键词:
摘要: Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated …
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