摘要: Most action can be explained in Humean or teleological terms; that is, most cases, one explain why someone acted by reference to person’s beliefs and desires. However, trusting being trustworthy are actions do not permit such explanation. The of something is a matter expecting act for certain reasons, acting trustworthily these reasons. It better say people out trust, rather than some end. Thus, considerations suffice trust. This the negative claim paper. Its positive proposal an account practical rationality key idea takes on commitments, merely way, but also premise one’s reasoning trust-based view interaction situation.
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