The social efficiency of instruments of promotion of renewable energies: A transaction-cost perspective

摘要: This paper compares the social efficiency of regulatory instruments used to promote renewable energy sources in electricity generation, taking into consideration their role promoting preservation collective goods. They are based on a purchase obligation and act either by price (feed-in tariffs) or quantity (bidding for new RES-E capacities; quotas). From Public Economics perspective, two distinct terms cost-efficacy market incentives world imperfect information. Exchangeable quotas green certificates preferred because this instrument allows better control over consumer costs whilst retaining incentives. Transaction cost economics (TCE) contributes assessment these instruments, introducing investment safeguard as major determinant efficiency, instruments' conformity its institutional environment viability. In light additional consideration, arrangements between producers obligated buyers inherent each fact quite similar-either long-term contracting vertical integration. We compare assess price- quantity-instruments several dimensions from both public TCE perspectives: consumers, safeguards investments, adaptability order preserve stability long run, incentive intensity, with regime industry. It shows neither offer an optimal solution dimensions. The government will thus select accordance relative importance objectives. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.