The core of a repeated n-person cooperative game
作者： Jorge Oviedo
DOI: 10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00335-5
关键词:
摘要: Abstract We study the core of a repeated cooperative game. define game as where in each round agents play introduce an imputation sequence and dominated sequence. set all undominated sequences. show that contains original
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(3)
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