摘要: Liability laws are a very attractive policy instrument in market economy for number of reasons. If an individual agent inflicts damage on another party, liability rules allow the costs to be attributed who caused damage. The originator will forced pay, and he not able transplant some social his action someone else. tend bring private into line. In principle, therefore, is efficient institution dealing with other third-party damages.
springer.com
sci-hub.st 参考文章(26)
Horst Siebert, Das produzierte Chaos : Ökonomie und Umwelt W. Kohlhammer. ,(1973)
Horst Siebert, Ökonomische Theorie der Umwelt Mohr. ,(1978)
Hans-Werner Sinn, Economic decisions under uncertainty ,(1983)
Jerry Green, On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws The Bell Journal of Economics. ,vol. 7, pp. 553- 574 ,(1976) , 10.2307/3003272
Horst Siebert, Europe '92: Environmental policy in an integrated market Research Papers in Economics. ,(1989)
Hans-Werner Sinn, Risiko als Produktionsfaktor Jahrbucher Fur Nationalokonomie Und Statistik. ,(1986)
Frank Hyneman Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit ,(1921)
Timothy O'Riordan, Anticipatory environmental policy impediments and opportunities Environmental Monitoring and Assessment. ,vol. 12, pp. 115- 125 ,(1989) , 10.1007/BF00394182
John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability The Journal of Legal Studies. ,vol. 2, pp. 4- ,(1973) , 10.1086/467501
Walter S Misiolek, Pollution control through price incentives: The role of rent seeking costs in monopoly markets Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. ,vol. 15, pp. 1- 8 ,(1988) , 10.1016/0095-0696(88)90023-X