Disaggregating Noncompliance: Exit andPredation in the Nonproliferation Regime

作者: Jeffrey Berejikian , Matthew Fuhrmann

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1367382

关键词:

摘要: How do countries behave towards international agreements they not intend to comply with? Do enter and cheat or decline participation altogether? We address these questions by analyzing how pursuing nuclear weapons treat the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Why some proliferators NPT while others not? argue that democratic are less likely join for a variety of theoretical reasons. A Heckman probit selection model designed analyze behavior between 1968 2006 reveals non-democratic substantially more than make deceitful nonproliferation commitments. Armed conflict strong norms increase likelihood states will disingenuously NPT. High levels industrial capacity reduce this probability. These findings enhance scholarly understanding proliferation generally underscore value disaggregating noncompliant behavior.

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