Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account

作者: Deirdre Curtin

DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0386.2007.00382.X

关键词:

摘要: This article addresses problems of accountability in relation to two specific kinds administrative actors the EU system multilevel governance, namely comitology committees and EU‐level agencies. With regard both sets actors, issue is often framed terms delegation from a principal an agent. explores powers discourse question whether this framing adequately covers forums mechanisms that are emerging as matter legal institutional practice. The latter sub‐constitutional level particularly relevant given high degree institutionalisation categories actors. Using these case studies, suggests model democratic sense not adequate only captures part A looser conceptual framing, understanding public process which power checked balanced by various fits better within more constitutional perspective on holding executive account.

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