Was Sellars an error theorist

作者: Peter Olen , Stephen P. Turner

DOI: 10.1007/S11229-015-0829-7

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摘要: Wilfrid Sellars described the moral syllogism that supports inference “I ought to do x” from “Everyone as a “syntactical disguise” which embodies “mistake.” He nevertheless regarded this form of reasoning constitutive point view. Durkheim was source much reasoning, and context illuminates Sellars’ unusual philosophical reconstruction view in terms collective intentions an ideal community rational members for is empirically valid. The also sheds light on question status common sense normativity naturalistic metaphysics.

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