摘要: I argue that John McDowell’s attempt to refute Wilfrid Sellars’s two-component analysis of perceptual experience and substitute for it a conception according which is the “conceptual shaping sensory consciousness” fails. McDowell does not recognize subtle dialectic in thought between transcendental empirical considerations favor substantive sense impressions, own proposal seems empty notion consciousness any real significance.
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