Emission allowances auction for an oligopolistic electricity market operating under cap-and-trade

摘要: The authors consider a yearly auction where electricity generating companies (Gencos) bid to receive green house gas (GHG) emission allowances. Gencos sell in an oligopolistic market that clears on hourly basis and operates under cap-and-trade emissions regulation scheme. strategically self-allocate their allowance into allowances they then use take part the market. If Genco emits above or below its self-allocated for hour then, first case, deficit is made up by buying from external market, whereas second surplus sold Recognising levels of power produced as well associated prices throughout year will be influenced both allowances, maximises objective function equal not only total amount obtain but also includes social welfare. This study proposes approach considers all above-mentioned points coordinated fashion can viewed mathematical program (the auction) subject Nash equilibrium problem distribution each allowances), which turn Cournot-Nash conditions