The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances
作者： Ranjay Gulati , Harbir Singh
DOI: 10.2307/2393616
关键词:
摘要: This study examines why firms choose different governance structures across their alliances. We focus on the coordination costs in alliances that arise from interdependence of tasks …
unirioja.es
questia.com
jstor.org参考文章(43)
Ronald Stuart Burt, Toward a structural theory of action ,(1982)
Jay W. Lorsch, Paul R. Lawrence, Organization and environment ,(1967)
Morris Silver, Enterprise and the scope of the firm ,(1984)
V. M. Glushkov, INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS Defense Technical Information Center. ,(1966) , 10.21236/AD0633642
Kenneth Joseph Arrow, The limits of organization ,(1974)
Robert P. Merges, Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope Columbia Law Review. ,vol. 90, pp. 839- ,(1990) , 10.2307/1122920
Harold Demsetz, Armen A Alchian, Production, information costs, and economic organization The American Economic Review. ,vol. 62, pp. 777- 795 ,(1972)
Sidney G. Winter, Economic "Natural Selection" and the Theory of the Firm LEM Chapters Series. pp. 225- 272 ,(1964)
Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry Journal of Law Economics & Organization. ,vol. 5, pp. 109- 126 ,(1989) , 10.1093/OXFORDJOURNALS.JLEO.A036960
J. E. Oxley, Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach Journal of Law Economics & Organization. ,vol. 13, pp. 387- 409 ,(1997) , 10.1093/OXFORDJOURNALS.JLEO.A023389