摘要: This article is about disclosure of quality. The question that it seeks to answer is: Does the free market offer enough incentive for business disclose? concludes whether information purely private value or not, more than socially-optimal amount takes place. optimal policy government subsidize sale without disclosure. offers no support mandatory results should be viewed with care, however, as they seem depend on special features model, in particular assumed impossibility misrepresentation.
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