Hotelling competition with multi-purchasing: Time Magazine, Newsweek, or both?

作者: Hans Jarle Kind , Hans Jarle Kind , Øystein Foros , Simon P. Anderson

DOI:

关键词:

摘要: Equilibrium prices behave quite differently if consumers single-purchase (buy either Time Magazine or Newsweek) some multi-purchase both). Prices are strategic complements under single-purchase, and increase with magazine quality. In a regime strategically independent because firms then act monopolistically by pricing the incremental benefit to marginal consumers. Furthermore, can decrease quality due overlapping content. Higher preference heterogeneity increases profits in equilibrium but decreases them multi-purchase. We determine when each holds, present detailed reaction function analysis which applies more generally duopoly pricing.

参考文章(55)
Charles Stuart, Charles Stuart, Henning Bohn, Henning Bohn, Population under a cap on greenhouse gas emissions Social Science Research Network. ,(2010)
Burkhard Heer, Burkhard Heer, Alfred Maussner, A Note on the Computation of the Equity Premium and the Market Value of Firm Equity Social Science Research Network. ,(2010)
Torben M. Andersen, Why Do Scandinavians Work Social Science Research Network. ,(2010)
Thomas Eichner, Thorsten Upmann, Thorsten Upmann, Thorsten Upmann, Tax-Competition with Involuntary Unemployment Social Science Research Network. ,(2010)
Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Martin Ruf, Shafik Hebous, The Effects of Taxation on the Location Decision of Multinational Firms: M&A vs. Greenfield Investments Social Science Research Network. ,(2010)
Matthias Wrede, Matthias Wrede, Multinational Capital Structure and Tax Competition Social Science Research Network. ,(2010)
Rudiger Pethig, Rudiger Pethig, Thomas Eichner, Efficient Management of Insecure Fossil Fuel Imports Through Taxing (!) Domestic Green Energy? Social Science Research Network. ,(2010)
David Waterman, Diversity and quality of information products in a monopolistically competitive industry Information Economics and Policy. ,vol. 4, pp. 291- 303 ,(1989) , 10.1016/0167-6245(89)90010-3