Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam

作者: John McMillan , Christopher Woodruff

DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/15.3.637

关键词:

摘要: Vietnam's firms contract without the shadow of law and only partly in future. Although contracting rests part on threat loss future business, often are willing to renegotiate following a breach, so retaliation is not as forceful standard repeated-game story effective sanction. To ensure agreements kept, rely other devices supplement incentives. Firms scrutinize their trading partners. Community sanctions occasionally invoked. Transactions with greater risk reneging supported by more elaborate governance structures. Ongoing relationships among serve reduce transaction costs market: locating partners, negotiating monitoring contracts, enforcing settling disputes. In an economy midst deep reform, especially severe because normal market-supporting institutions still being built. We examine this article how use ongoing maintain agreements. For snapshot process building institutions, we 1995-1997 survey privately owned manufacturing Hanoi Ho Chi Minh City. The new ways doing business Vietnam have been devised at ground level. bottom-up reform has relied de facto decentralization economic activity, while leaving place formal central planning. government introduced few policies foster private sector, "the owners worked out own ad hoc strategy for development which popular, oral rather than

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