Financial market lobbies and pension reform

作者: Achim Kemmerling , Michael Neugart

DOI: 10.1016/J.EJPOLECO.2008.12.003

关键词:

摘要: Abstract We develop a model in which firms the financial market lobby government to lower compulsory contributions public pension system. Firms order increase demand from households for their old-age savings products. conclude with comparison of two major reforms Europe exemplifying influence lobbies on policies.

参考文章(54)
David Card, Richard Blundell, Richard B. Freeman, Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980-2000 National Bureau of Economic Research--Comparative Labor Markets Series. University of Chicago Press (2004). ,(2004) , 10.7208/CHICAGO/9780226092904.001.0001
Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, Sarah Smith, Pension Reform and Economic Performance in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s Social Science Research Network. pp. 233- 274 ,(2004) , 10.3386/W9556
Heinrich W. Ursprung, Arye L. Hillman, Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy: Reply The American Economic Review. ,vol. 78, pp. 1476- 1478 ,(2016)
Casey Mulligan, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories Social Science Research Network. ,(1999) , 10.3386/W7118
Paola Profeta, Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model International Tax and Public Finance. ,vol. 9, pp. 331- 348 ,(2002) , 10.1023/A:1016539016693
Herbert Kitschelt, None, Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism ,(1999)
Ellen M. Immergut, Isabelle Schulze, Karen M. Anderson, The handbook of West European pension politics Research Papers in Economics. ,(2007)
Avinash Dixit, Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation Eastern Economic Journal. ,vol. 22, pp. 375- 388 ,(1996)