Peer Choice in CEO Compensation
作者： Ana M Albuquerque , Gus De Franco , Rodrigo S Verdi
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1362047
关键词:
摘要: Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We …
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(51)
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