Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer Groups

作者: Michael W. Faulkender , Jun Yang

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.972197

关键词:

摘要: This paper considers the features of newly disclosed compensation peer groups and demonstrates their significant role in explaining variations chief executive officer (CEO) beyond that other benchmarks such as industry-size peers. After controlling for industry, size, visibility, CEO responsibility, talent flows, we find firms appear to select highly paid peers justify this effect is stronger where group smaller, chairman board directors, has longer tenure, directors are busier serving on multiple boards.

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