CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect
作者： Scott Schaefer , Rachel M. Hayes
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.966332
关键词:
摘要: The "Lake Wobegon Effect," which is widely cited as a potential cause for rising CEO pay, said to occur because no firm wants admit having who below average, and so allows its CEO's pay package lag market expectations. We develop game-theoretic model of this Effect. In our model, wage may serve signal match surplus, therefore affect the value firm. compare equilibria full-information case derive conditions under equilibrium wages are distorted upward.
sci-hub.se 参考文章(22)
Michael Sattinger, Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings Journal of Economic Literature. ,vol. 31, pp. 831- 880 ,(1993)
Charles A. O'Reilly III, Brian G. Main, Graef S. Crystal, CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories Administrative Science Quarterly. ,vol. 33, pp. 257- 274 ,(1988) , 10.2307/2393058
Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia Journal of Political Economy. ,vol. 96, pp. 61- 80 ,(1988) , 10.1086/261524
Yun W. Park, Toni Nelson, Mark R. Huson, EXECUTIVE PAY AND THE DISCLOSURE ENVIRONMENT: CANADIAN EVIDENCE Journal of Financial Research. ,vol. 24, pp. 347- 365 ,(2001) , 10.1111/J.1475-6803.2001.TB00774.X
Philip H. Dybvig, Jaime F. Zender, Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information Review of Financial Studies. ,vol. 4, pp. 201- 219 ,(1991) , 10.1093/RFS/4.1.201
Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior Quarterly Journal of Economics. ,vol. 104, pp. 655- 669 ,(1989) , 10.2307/2937861
Mathias Dewatripont, Commitment Through Renegotiation- Proof Contracts with Third Parties The Review of Economic Studies. ,vol. 55, pp. 377- 390 ,(1988) , 10.2307/2297390
John Moran, John Morgan, Employee recruiting and the Lake Wobegon effect Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. ,vol. 50, pp. 165- 182 ,(2003) , 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00046-X
J. Sterling Livingston, Pygmalion in Management ,(2009)
John C. Persons, Renegotiation and the Impossibility of Optimal Investment Review of Financial Studies. ,vol. 7, pp. 419- 449 ,(1994) , 10.1093/RFS/7.2.419