CEOs and the Product Market: When are Powerful CEOs Beneficial?
作者： Minwen Li , Yao Lu , Gordon M. Phillips
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2450893
关键词:
摘要: We find that in rapidly changing, competitive product markets, CEO power has a positive impact on the value of firm. Additionally, firms with powerful CEOs tend to invest and advertise more these markets. In addition whether also chairs board is company founder, “soft” power, as captured by CEO’s connections executives directors through appointment decisions, helps firm react efficiently market changes threats. Our findings imply markets play an important role affecting benefits costs power.
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