Does market power discipline CEO power? An agency perspective
作者： Anutchanat Jaroenjitrkam , Chia‐Feng (Jeffrey) Yu , Ralf Zurbruegg
DOI: 10.1111/EUFM.12240
关键词:
摘要: We examine how product market competition (PMC) shapes chief executive officer's (CEO) power. Using various measures to capture both PMC and CEO power, our analyses, which include a quasi‐natural experiment, find evidence that CEOs have less power when the is more competitive. Furthermore, impact of on pronounced for firms with entrenched management, lower ownership, analyst coverage, experiencing good ‘luck’ (windfall performance). Our results suggest can act as substitute corporate governance in disciplining particularly prone agency problems.
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