作者: Marc Goergen , Peter Limbach , Meik Scholz
DOI: 10.1016/J.JCORPFIN.2015.08.011
关键词: Microeconomics 、 Enterprise value 、 Financial crisis 、 Endogeneity 、 Economics 、 German 、 Random effects model 、 Power (social and political) 、 Panel data 、 Identification (information)
摘要: Abstract We study the relation between chair of board directors and CEO. argue that substantial age dissimilarity two—giving rise to cognitive conflict—increases monitoring firm value for firms with greater needs. find evidence our hypothesis using data on German two-tier boards. law mitigates endogeneity concerns as it prevents CEO duality also restricts power in other ways. Additional identification attempts include CEO-firm chair-firm fixed effects, random dynamic panel estimations, use 2007 financial crisis an exogenous shock during crisis, when fast decision making managerial discretion were needed, link changed.