Firm Risk Taking versus CEO Diversification: Evidence from Outsourcing Firms
作者： S. Katie Moon
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2184323
关键词:
摘要: I examine CEO compensation in outsourcing firms, using a new database of purchase obligations from firm 10-Ks. find that the intensity can significantly explain variations compensation; more firms do outsourcing, they pay to their CEOs. Outsourcing promote managerial risk-taking by proportionally equity-based compensation. However, also need compensate additionally CEOs for higher risk exposure firms' increased total risks. show determine level and structure based on this optimal trade-off.
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