Formal and Informal Ratification in the Intergovernmental Policies of the European Union

摘要: Putnam’s theory of “two-level games” has spawned numerous studies examining the interaction between international and domestic politics, many focusing on politics in European Union. While noting that ratification may be formal or informal, much this literature treats each important actor as if it de facto power. This means overlooks very real distinction informal ratification. Informal thought a case which government pays “audience costs” for unpopular agreements. In case, must respond continuously to public opinion. presents constraints different from those faced by governments who obtain approval legislature (or other actor). For example, divided no effect likelihood but often does affect distribution gains, while affects gains. Because these kinds differ significantly, metaphor is not always most appropriate conceptualization two-level The especially inappropriate studying policy-making second third pillars EU, are mostly characterized intergovernmental bargaining without requirements.