On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Subjectivism in the Transcendental Deduction

摘要: In this chapter, I expound Hegel’s critique of Kant, which he first and most elaborately presented in his early essay “Faith Knowledge” (1802), by focusing on the criticism that Hegel levelled against Kant’s (supposedly) arbitrary subjectivism about categories. This relates to restriction thesis transcendental idealism: categorially governed empirical knowledge only applies appearances, not things themselves, so does reach objective reality, according Hegel. claims appearances is unwarranted merely basis own principle apperception, just stems from empiricist bias. He argues apperception as foundational fact incompatible with empiricism. rightly appraises centrality for constitution objectivity. But wrong its incompatibility realism. By virtue a misapprehension formal distinction between accompanying ‘I think’, i.e. analytical what calls “the true ‘I’” original-synthetic unity unjustifiably prises apart productive imagination, supposedly “true ‘I’”, understanding, derivative, subjective form imagination; latter, Hegel, Reason or Being itself, truly objective. deflationary reading hypostatises imagination supreme principle, rests distortion key elements theory apperception. show charge inconsistency namely, claim highest cognition comport thesis, direct consequence psychological misreading subjectivism.