The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe: payments for wildlife services

摘要: Abstract Payments for environmental services (PES) have been distinguished from the more common integrated conservation and development projects on grounds that PES are direct, cost-effective, less complex institutionally, therefore likely to produce desired results. Both kinds of schemes aim achieve similar outcomes, however, generally function in analogous social, political economic environments. Given relative novelty PES, what lessons can be learnt applied earlier initiatives? In this paper, we describe evolution over first 12 years (1989–2001) Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), a community-based natural resource management programme which Rural District Councils, behalf communities communal land, granted authority market access wildlife their district safari operators. These turn sell hunting photographic safaris mostly foreign sport hunters eco-tourists. The Councils pay dividend according an agreed formula. practice, there some underpayments frequent delays. During 1989–2001, CAMPFIRE generated US$20 million transfers participating communities, 89% came hunting. scale benefits varied greatly across districts, wards households. Twelve 37 districts with produced 97% all revenues, reflecting variability resources local institutional arrangements. has widely emulated southern eastern Africa. We suggest five main emerging schemes: community-level commercial transactions seldom pursued isolation; non-differentiated payments weaken incentives; start-up costs high may need underwritten; competitive bidding allow service providers hold rents; must flexible adaptive.