Intermediation and the equilibrium allocation of investment capital: Implications for economic development

作者: John H. Boyd , Bruce D. Smith

DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(92)90004-L

关键词:

摘要: Abstract We investigate several common assertions about intermediation and how it affects the allocation of investment capital. use a model with adverse selection costly state verification in which both debt contracts credit rationing are observed. Intermediaries arise due to comparative advantage information acquisition. Relative situation absent intermediation, intermediaries reduce (inefficient) interest rate differentials. The also shows large differentials can be observed when financial markets not integrated volume is affected by changes environment.

参考文章(19)
Stephen D. Williamson, Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing The Quarterly Journal of Economics. ,vol. 102, pp. 135- 145 ,(1987) , 10.2307/1884684
Andrew Weiss, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. The American Economic Review. ,vol. 71, pp. 393- 410 ,(1981) , 10.7916/D8V12FT1
Eirik Evenhouse, Barbara Kafka, Yoon Je Cho, Robert Wieland, Millard F. Long, Dimitri Vittas, Gerhard Pohl, Warren L. Coats, Catherine Mann, Robert Vogel, World development report 1989 pp. 1- 267 ,(1989)
Costas Azariadis, Bruce D. Smith, Adverse Selection in the Overlapping Generations Model: The Case of Pure Exchange Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 60, pp. 277- 305 ,(1993) , 10.1006/JETH.1993.1044
Bruce D. Smith, Michael J. Stutzer, Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis Real Estate Economics. ,vol. 17, pp. 177- 193 ,(1989) , 10.1111/1540-6229.00483
Stephen D. Williamson, Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing Journal of Monetary Economics. ,vol. 18, pp. 159- 179 ,(1986) , 10.1016/0304-3932(86)90074-7
John H Boyd, Edward C Prescott, Financial intermediary-coalitions Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 38, pp. 211- 232 ,(1986) , 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90115-8