Information markets, elections and contracts
作者： Hans Gersbach , Markus Müller
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摘要: Politicians may pander to public opinion and renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, democratic elections. An market is used predict the performance of policy, while contracts stipulate price level on that politician must reach have right stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, balance, increases social welfare. Finally, suggest several ways avoid manipulation markets discuss possible pitfalls mechanism.
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