Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination

摘要: It is traditional in the theory of firm to define production opportunity set available terms its boundary-the maximum attainable output quantities for various input quantities, given state technology and knowledge. This boundary function firm. One our purposes here point up dependence suchproduction functions on structure property rights contracting within which exists. We redefine order recognize rights. That incorporate The problems surrounding role labor a variety str-uctures are analyzed recognizing this dependence. These structures include (1) "labor-managed firm" system (in common stock claims legally prohibited), (2) codetermination industrial democracy movements law requires management participation by labor), (3) cooperatives professional partnerships (i.e., quasi-labormanaged firms arise out voluntary contracting), (4) capitalist corporation. criticize claim that labor-managed efficient. Presented at Conference Effects Labor Participation Management Business Firms Western World, Dallas, February 1977, sponsored Liberty Fund; Fourth Annual Interlaken Seminar Analysis Ideology, Interlaken, June Center Research Government Policy University Rochester. indebted David Henderson, Eugene Fama, Keith Leffler, Frank Milne, Tom Russell, Jerold Zimmerman, participants Economics Workshop Rochester Graduate School discussions these issues, but they should not be held responsible refusal accept some their suggestions. also an anonymous referee John Gould comments, Armen Alchian helping us over years understand more clearly importance determining human behavior. work has been partially supported Managerial Rochester, Management.