Multiple effect of social influence on cooperation in interdependent network games.

摘要: The social influence exists widely in the human society, where individual decision-making process (from congressional election to electronic commerce) may be affected by attitude and behavior of others belonging different networks. Here, we couple snowdrift (SD) game prisoner's dilemma (PD) on two interdependent networks, strategies both games are associated mimick majority rule. More accurately, individuals' updating refers learning (based payoff difference) above-mentioned (related with environment group), which is controlled strength s. Setting s = 0 decouples networks returns traditional network game; while its increase involves interactions between By means numerous Monte Carlo simulations, find that such a mechanism brings multiple evolution cooperation. Small leads unequal cooperation level games, because still main rule for most players. Though intermediate large guarantees synchronized strategy pairs, finally dies out reaches completely dominance cases. Interestingly, these observations attributed expansion clusters. Our work provide new understanding emergence intercorrelated systems.