Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense

作者: William S. Robinson

DOI: 10.1023/A:1017933132500

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摘要: In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and undercutting Carruthers‘ argument. doing latter, distinguish an intrinsic theory consciousness relational consciousness. This two readings, one which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. argue neither reading offers successful view.

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