摘要: Most work on the psychology of justice has failed to state explicitly, let alone justify, its underlying definitional assumptions. This failure inevitably led conceptual confusion and inconsistent use terminology. The definition adopted in this chapter is that involves an evaluative judgment about moral rightness a person’s fate: is, treatment by others (including nonhuman forces) judged be just if it corresponds some standard or criterion what morally right.1 Some psychologists have implicitly assumed more restricted definitions justice, such as objective impartial persons (i. e., fairness). limits concept how people should treated only when there are competing claims conflicts interest. In my view, restriction places undue emphasis scarcity competition human interaction, pervasive but also distorting (see Gross & Averill, 1983). I am assuming refers not fair respect for needs rights inherent nature—an assumption shared (e. g., Adler, 1981) all Buchanan Mathieu, Chapter 2, volume). Justice usually said exist receive they due, due fairness consistent with their natural beings. When discussing other authors who defined narrowly, placed single quotation marks around word order distinguish usage from own.