The impact of risk attitude in new product development under dual information asymmetry

摘要: Four classes of uncertain principal agent models are presented.The closed form expressions for the optimal wage contracts derived.The information values idea and effort characterized.Several interesting managerial insights provided. This paper investigates impact risk attitude on incentives performances in a two-stage (research stage development stage) new product setting with one senior executive (she) project manager (he). The offers contract to presence dual asymmetry including his unknown value early research unobservable convert into later stage. Due variability technology market, subjective assessments about revenue generated by characterized as variables. Within framework uncertainty theory, we first present four models, then derive their respective mechanisms. We find that structures executive's mechanisms depend manager's attitude. If becomes more conservative, should set low incentive term avert risk. Otherwise, she do opposite. Moreover, identify two values: idea-how much is willing pay acquire regarding value, effort-how ensures win when can effort. Our results show acquiring yields highest potential aggressive, but case contracting effort, opposite appears be true. also indicate an aggressive always has higher profits than provide several through our analytical simulation results.