Firm Financed Education and Specific Human Capital: A Test of the Insurance Hypothesis

作者: Michael J. Feuer , Henry A. Glick , Anand Desai

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-76986-3_3

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摘要: This paper reports results from our continuing research on firm-financed education and training. Our work is motivated by Gary Becker’s formulation of general training as a public good that will not be provided firms unless it financed entirely the trainees.3 So compelling was model for many economists case closed: if are observed to paying, then either or else their investment being subsidized trainees’ foregone wages some other source. In place this tautology we have been investigating whether, indeed, pay training, so how those investments affect turnover.

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