Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge

作者: Jennifer Lackey

DOI: 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199219162.001.0001

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摘要: Introduction 1. The Nature of Testimony 2. Rejecting Transmission 3. A Defense Learning from Words 4. Norms Assertion and Testimonial Knowledge 5. Critique Reductionism Non-Reductionism 6. Dualism in the Epistemology 7. Positive Reasons, Defeaters, Infant/Child Objection 8. Trust Assurance: Interpersonal View Appendix. Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source

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