Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games
作者： Brit Grosskopf , Rosemarie Nagel
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.286573
关键词:
摘要: Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In paper we study the argument whether a deviation from theory is because rational, but doubt others rational as well, compared to subjects, general, boundedly themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, behavior repeated 2-person many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which strategically different one another. We analyze four treatments observe convergence toward equilibrium driven by learning through information about other player s choice adaptation rather than self-initiated reasoning.
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