The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game

作者: Eileen Chou , Margaret McConnell , Rosemarie Nagel , Charles R. Plott

DOI: 10.1007/S10683-008-9206-4

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摘要: This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to behave according predictions of game theory in two-person “guessing game” (beauty contest game) experiments. In this game, two individuals simultaneously choose a number between 0 100. The winner is person whose chosen closest 2/3 average numbers. weakly dominant strategy zero. Because simplicity widespread failure has been interpreted evidence some fundamental inability strategically. By contrast, we find subjects’ behavior reflects lack understanding form, which define relationships possible choices, outcomes payoffs. To surprising degree, seem have little experimental environment they are participating. If do not understand control needed for testing lost. experiments reported here demonstrate act strategically related how presented. We test well able recognize under variety different presentations game. Some form when it presented abstractly. When transformed into simple isomorphic familiar context, strategies. While our results confirm ability make strategic decisions, also emphasize need limitations grasp experimenter intends. Given these limitations, provide suggestions better control.

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