摘要: I study the limits of mediated conflict resolution when: states have incentives to misrepresent private information; mediators may limited capacity enforce agreement; and political leaders in crisis bargaining situations are subject domestic constraints. With a mechanism design approach, characterize conditions for existence peaceful settlements as weighed resource budget constraint. examine how (lack of) enforcement impact mediators’ ability implement settlements. When fail, establish strict monotonicity theorems about leaders’ war-propensity payoff, derive their implications on optimal constraints general games.
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