摘要: This paper analyzes a model of bargaining in which two parties use mediator who sequentially makes random proposals until agreement by both is reached. I show that as the cost delay shrinks to zero, subgame perfect payoff converges asymmetric Nash solution with weights determined relative discount rates players. also establish conditions for uniqueness equilibrium arbitrary rates.
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