Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks
作者： Paul L. Joskow , Jean Tirole
DOI: 10.2307/2600996
关键词:
摘要: … As we shall see, the more initial holders of rights can free ride on the ability of G2 to increase the value of these rights by exercising market power, the fewer rights is G2 likely to acquire …
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