Core Voters or Local Allies? Presidential Discretionary Spending in Centralized and Decentralized Systems in Latin America

摘要: Starting in the late 1990s, traditional opposition parties Latin America started to capture presidencies. Some of these have dramatically shifted resources core voters as promised, while others been slower realize their campaign agendas. I argue this difference depends on presidents' incentives which differ between centralized and decentralized systems. All presidents want be re-elected, but when local officials are powerful often opposed president, worry that rivals will steal credit for provision goods. This mechanism deters from targeting directly. Instead, systems compensate by delivering more goods where co-partisans, even if plurality did not support president there. Resource allocation should thus depend partisan control office In it voters' mayor president. demonstrate pattern across 12 years 100,000 municipalities Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela. My analysis draws observational data, well in-depth interviews with current or former presidents, governors, several mayors.