Deregulation and the Problem of Capacity/Price Planning for the Transport and Communication Infrastructure
作者： Werner Rothengatter
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-75571-2_14
关键词: Price mechanism 、 Transport infrastructure 、 User group 、 Industrial organization 、 Competition (economics) 、 Government regulation 、 Deregulation 、 Marginal cost 、 Economics 、 Cost allocation
摘要: Transport and communication are sectors in which the efficiency of price mechanism is traditionally questioned government regulation assumed to be necessary addition normal rules competition. In all countries roads waterways very largely publicly owned. Railways mostly belong government-controlled companies, same holds for telecom sector.
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