作者: Yan Zhang , Dongmo Zhang
DOI:
关键词: Solution concept 、 Sequential equilibrium 、 Equilibrium selection 、 Markov perfect equilibrium 、 Mathematical optimization 、 Subgame perfect equilibrium 、 Inference 、 Negotiation 、 Epsilon-equilibrium 、 Belief revision 、 Computer science 、 Trembling hand perfect equilibrium 、 Nash equilibrium 、 Subgame
摘要: This paper presents a computational model of negotiation based on Nebel's syntax-based belief revision. The guarantees unique bargaining solution for each game without using lotteries. Its game-theoretic properties are discussed against the existence and uniqueness Nash equilibrium subgame perfect equilibrium. We also study essential in relation to our model. In particular, we show that deal membership checking is DP-complete corresponding agreement inference problem Π2P-hard.