A logical model of Nash bargaining solution
作者： Dongmo Zhang
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摘要: This paper presents a logical extension of Nash's Cooperative Bargaining Theory. We introduce concept entrenchment measurement, which maps propositions to real numbers, as vehicle represent agent's belief states and attitudes towards bargaining situations. show that solution can be restated in terms bargainers states. Negotiable items, outcomes conflicting arguments then explicitly expressed propositional logic meanwhile numerical problem is still applicable.
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ijcai.org 参考文章(15)
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